The claim of quantum cryptography has always been that it can provide protocols that are unconditionally secure, that is, for which the security does not rely on any restriction on the time, space or technology available to the cheaters. We show that this claim cannot be applied to any quantum bit commitment protocol. We briefly discuss the consequences for quantum cryptography.
Introduction
Since the beginning of quantum cryptography [1, 20] the claim has always been that it can provide protocols that are unconditionally secure, that is, for which the security does not rely on any restriction on the time, space or thechnology available to the cheaters. Even the quantum bit commitment protocol of [3] , hereafter called the BCJL protocol, was believed to be provably unconditionally secure. We show that, on the contrary, an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.
We knew for quite some time that the BCJL protocol was not unconditionally secure [15, 16] . However, other kinds of quantum bit commitment protocols have been proposed (see the Acknowledgement section). One alternative consists in having the photons travel in the reverse direction compared with the original BCJL protocol, another is based upon a sophisticated use of entanglement, and so on. We have broken each of these proposed alternatives and each time we obtained a better insight about the problem. This insight allowed us to obtain the general result which we present in this paper.
Note that Lo and Chau [13] have independently shown that the unconditional security of a restricted category of quantum bit commitment protocols is impossible. However, this category does not include the BCJL protocol [16] nor any of the above alternatives.
The impossibility of unconditional security for bit commitment means the impossibility of unconditional security for oblivious transfer as well as for many other important cryptographic tasks. Fortunately, quantum key distribution is definitively unconditionally secure [21, 14, 17] . Furthermore, for a task where unconditional security is not possible, computational security would still be very interesting: where is the insecurity if we can prove that it takes at the least 2 60 years to cheat. Computational security for bit commitment has not yet been proven in the classical (i.e., non-quantum) world. That is, the computational security of the currently known classical bit com- * Supported in part by FCAR mitment protocols relies on unproven assumptions. This paper shows that unconditional security for bit commitments and many other important tasks is impossible, but the question of computational security in the quantum world is still open. At the least for the time being, there is some hope that computational security is easier to obtain in the quantum world than in the classical world.
Bit Commitment
Any cryptographic task defines the relationship between inputs and outputs respectively entered and received by the task's participants. In bit commitment, Alice enters a bit b. At a later time, Bob may request this bit and, whenever he does, he receives this bit, otherwise he learns nothing about b.
In a naive but concrete realization of bit commitment, Alice puts the bit b into a safe of which she keeps the key and then gives the safe to Bob. At a later time, if Bob requests the bit, Alice gives the key to Bob. The main point is that Alice cannot change her mind about the bit b chosen during the commit phase and Bob learns nothing about it unless he obtains the key.
The main result
For every quantum bit commitment protocol Q, we shall construct a protocol Q, show that the non-security of Q implies the non-security of Q and then show that Q is insecure.
Let us consider a quantum bit commitment protocol Q where Alice commits a bit b to Bob. Let A and B stand for Alice and Bob respectively. The state space H in which the protocol Q is executed is of the form H A ⊗ H B where H A and H B are state spaces on Alice's side and Bob's side respectively. Alice's and Bob's generation of classical variables, measurements, unitary transformations, etc. in the commit phase of Q can be seen as a single measurement executed conjointly by Bob and Alice on the entire state space H A ⊗H B . Any classical information generated or received by a participant corresponds to an outcome of this measurement received by this participant. Now, we construct Q. The entire commit phase of Q corresponds to the single overall measurement described above except that the outcomes of this measurement are not observed by the participants: they are stored in additional quantum systems. More precisely, for every P ∈ {A, B}, the state space on P 's side is of the form It is not hard to see that the non-security of Q implies the non-security of Q. Let P, X ∈ {A, B} stand respectively for the dishonest and the honest participants in Q and assume that P can cheat in Q. A dishonest P in Q can do exactly as the corresponding P in Q. The two protocols will still differ by the behavior of their honest participant. However, this difference disappears and leaves no trace after the honest participant X in Q has measured his system H ′ X . Therefore, the resulting random situation in Q at the beginning of the commit phase is the same random situation that holds in Q. So, if P succeeds in Q, P also succeeds in Q. Now, we must show that Q is insecure. It is a principle that we must assume that every participant knows every detail of the protocol, including the probability distribution of any random variable generated by the other participant. There is no loss of generality in assuming that at the beginning of the protocol, the overall system is in a pure state |ψ ∈ H = H A ⊗ H B : the preparation of a mixture could be included as a part of the protocol. The commit phase of the protocol specifies a unitary transformation U (b) on the entire system (b is the bit chosen by Alice). So at the end of the commit phase, the overall system is in a final state |φ
It is fair to assume that every thing outside H A is under the control of a dishonest Bob. In other words, there is no third system H C . For b = 0, 1, let ρ B are too far away is given by constructive results [7, 9, 12, 16] .
We shall do the simpler case ρ (0)
The more subtle case where the density matrices are not identical can be done as in [16] . Because ρ
B , Bob cannot cheat, but we shall show that Alice can. Consider the respective Schmidt decomposition [9, 19] of |φ (0) and |φ (1) given by
In the above formula, λ i are eigenvalues of the three density matrices ρ B , ρ
A and ρ
A . The fact that these three density matrices share the same positive eigenvalues with the same multiplicity is part of the Schmidt decomposition theorem [9, 19] . The states |e also maps |φ (0) into |φ (1) . Alice can compute the components of the states |φ (0) and |φ (1) : how to compute them is fixed by the protocol. Furthermore, the Schmidt decomposition theorem is constructive: the construction involves only operations such as diagonalization. Therefore, with an arbitrary precision, she can determine the above unitary transformation and construct a machine that can execute it.
In order to cheat, Alice creates the state |φ (0) . In other words, she does what she must honestly do in Q when she has b = 0 in mind. After the commit, if she wants to change her mind, she only has to send |φ (0) into |φ (1) . Note that this strategy works only if an honest Alice is able to pass every test in Q, that is, Alice must be able to execute her part in Q as efficiently as she executes her part in Q. This point has been realized only after an analysis of a protocol which has been specifically designed by Crépeau [6] in order to make use of this fact. Nevertheless, Crépeau's protocol could also be broken. In general, the honest participants inQ can pass any test of the commit phase that would normally be passed in Q; they only execute in superposition all the computations that are associated with an assignment of values that may possibly be taken by the classical variables in Q. Therefore, one cannot obtain the security of Q (and indirectly of Q) by testing the efficiency of the participants during the commit phase.
The use of tests during the opening phase to prevent Alice from changing her mind does not work either because by definition of bit commitment and unconditional security we cannot assume any restriction on the time elapsed between the commit and the opening phases, thus Alice has enough time to execute the unitary transformation that maps |φ (0) into φ (1) if she wants to change her mind. This concludes the proof that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.
Discussion and open questions
An idea to avoid the above impossibility result is to consider a weaker form of bit commitment where the time elapsed between the commit and the opening phases is fixed in the definition of the task. Computational security is indeed possible for this weaker form of bit commitment [6] . Furthermore, it may seem that this weaker form of bit commitment is sufficient in the QOT protocol of [2, 21, 14] : when a bit committed by Bob in the above QOT is opened, it is always opened (almost) immediately after the commit phase. However, on the contrary, this weaker form of bit commitment is not at all sufficient for the above QOT: even if a committed bit is not actually opened in this QOT, the requirement is still that if it were to be opened later Bob could not change his mind.
This does not mean that computational security is not possible. Whether or not a computationally secure quantum bit commitment exists is still an open question. A proof that no computationally secure quantum bit commitment exists would imply that no computationally secure classical bit commitment exists and this alone is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the other direction, the construction of a provably computationally secure quantum bit commitment protocol does not appear to be easy, if it is possible at all. In the classical case, no success has yet been obtained but the quantum world seems to provide an additional flexibility which we believe has not yet been fully exploited. The BCJL quantum bit commitment protocol is most likely not computationally secure, but this protocol was designed at a time when the quantum tools to attack quantum bit commitment just began to be understood.
The absence of a provably secure quantum bit commitment is a serious concern because many quantum protocols depend on the security of bit commitment [2, 5, 4, 21] . On the other hand, not all of Quantum Cryptography falls apart. This is because our earlier proof of security for quantum key distribution [14, 17] holds even if secure quantum bit commitment is not possible, despite the fact that it is based on an earlier "proof" of security for quantum oblivious transfer that fails in the absence of a secure bit commitment scheme. The reason is that the proof of security for quantum key distribution does not depend on the security of quantum oblivious transfer, but rather on the (correct) proof that quantum oblivious transfer would be secure if implemented on top of a secure bit commitment scheme. An example of such a proof for Quantum Oblivious Transfer is provided in [21, 17] .
Also, it should be noticed that a provably secure bit commitment protocol might be found some time in the future before the construction of any provably secure classical (i.e., non-quantum) oblivious transfer. This is certainly possible because it is well known that computationally secure bit commitments are possible under the assumption that one-way functions exist [10, 8, 18] , and Impagliazzo and Rudich have proved that one-way functions are not sufficient to implement OT in the classical (i.e., non-quantum) model [11] . If this turns out to be the case, the currently known quantum oblivious transfer protocols will be provably computationally secure at a time where no provably computationally secure classical OT is available (see section 5.2 in [2] ).
